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[L. A. No. 28859. In Bank. July 1, 1966.] 
JOHN J. ZITNY, Petitioner, v.' THE STATE BAR OF 
CALIFORNI.k, Respondent. 
[1) Attorneys-Disciplinary Proceedings-Review-Findings.-In 
disciplinary proceedings by the State Bar, findings of fact 
made by local administrative committees and the Board of 
Governors are not binding on the Supreme Court, which will 
weigh the evidence on which the findings rest. 
[2) Id.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Review-]5urden of Proof.-In 
a proceeding to review a recolllDlendation for an attorney's 
disbarment, the attorney has the burden to demonstrate that 
Jindings by the local committee and the Board of Governors are 
not supported by the evidence or that their recommendations 
are erroneous or unlawful. In meeting tbis burden, the attorney 
must demonstrate that the charges of unprofessional conduct 
are not sustained by convincing proof and to a reasonable 
certainty. 
[8] Id.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Beview-Evidence.-In review-
ing a recommendation for an attorney's disbarment, the Su-
preme Court will resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of the 
accused. Where two or more equally reasonable inferences may 
be drawn from a proved fact, the inference leading to the 
conclusion of innocence rather than guilt will be accepted. 
[4] Id.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Review-Evidence. - Though 
the Supreme Court is reluctant to reverse a local administra-
tive coml}littee's decision to disbar an attorney when its find-
ings and recommendations rest primarily on testimonial evi-
dence, less reliance is placed on the rule that the trier of fact 
is in a better position to evaluate the evidence when a jury 
heard much of the same evidence and acquitted the attorney of 
virtually the same charges involved in the disciplinary proceed-
ings. 
[6] Id.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Gronnds-Crimes-B1fect of 
Acquittal.-Acquittal of an attorney in a criminal trial does 
not bar the institution against him of disbarment proceedings 
even where the issues in both proceedings are identical. 
[6] Id.-Disciplinary Proceedings - Evidence. - To establish an 
-attorney's wilful breach of the rules of professional conduct, it 
Mclt. Dig. References; [1] Attorneys, § 174(7); [2] Attorneys, 
§175; [3] Attorneys, §176(5); [4] Attorneys, §176(3); [5] At-
torneys, § 145; [6] Attorneys, § 162; [7] Attorneys, § 160; [8] 
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must be demonstrated that he acted or omitted to act pur-
posely, that is, that he knew what he was doing or not doing 
and that he intended either to commit the act or to abstain 
from committing it. The wilfulness or intent may be proved by 
direct or circumstantial evidence. 
[7] ld. - Disciplinary Proceedings - Presumptions. - Though a 
charge of unprofessional conduct and findings of the local ad-
ministrative committee and the Board of Governors were defec-
tive in failing to specify that the attorney's breach was wilful, 
prejudice is not presumed from such a procedural error. 
[8] Id.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Review-Evidence.-An attor-
ney's breach of p~ofessional conduct was wilful and the defect 
in pleadings and findings in failing to specify his breach as 
wilful was not prejudicial where it was shown that he wilfully 
omitted to place a $12,000 contingent fee deposit in a separate 
clients' trust account and that he had no bona fide and reason-
able belief that facts existed justifying such omission. 
[9] Id.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Violation of Rules of Oonduct. 
-The purpose of requiring an attorney's sequestration of a 
client's funds (rule 9 of the Rules of Professional Conduct) is 
not limited to protecting the funds from the attorney's cred-
itors. The rule~ are designed to establish ethical standards for 
the bar and to prohibit unprofessional conduct. 
[10] Id.:-D~cip1insry Proceedings-Violation of Rules of Oonduct. 
-Although Bus. &; Prof. Code, § 6067, recognizes attorneys are 
not infallible and cannot be expected to know all the law, and 
a mistake of law made in good faith may be a defense, § 6077, 
proscribes imy wilful violation of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct and does not make knowledge of the ru,les an element 
of the offense of failing to sequester a client's funds in viola-
tion of rule 9. 
[11] Id.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Review-Evidence. - In dis-
ciplinary proceedings, charges against an attorney of soliciting 
bribes were not sustained by convincing proof and to a reason-
able certainty where it was shown that he had been acquitted 
by a jury of criminal charges involving the bribes and the 
only undisputed facts were as consistent with his innocence as 
with his guilt, with the possible exception of one incident that 
did not constitute persuasive evidence of guilt in view of the 
circumstances under which it occurred. 
PROCEEDING to review a recommendation of disbarment. 
Petitioner publicly reprimanded. 
[8] See Cal.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law, § 129. 
[9] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law, §§ 60-62 j Am.Jur.2d, At-
torneys at Law, § 38. 
) 
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Sam E. Collins for Petitioner. 
F. LaMar Forshee and Herbert M. Rosenthal for Respond-
ent. 
THE COURT.-In this proceeding petitioner seeks a review 
of the recommendation of the Board of Governors of t11e State 
Bar that he be disbarred. 
In October 1961, petitioner and one Job Denni, a council-
man in the City of Cypress, were indicted on charges of con-
spiring to solicit bribes, soliciting bribes, and receiving bribes. 
The criminal acts were alleged to have occurred during three 
separate transactions. After a jury trial, petitioner and Denni 
were acquitted on all counts. 
Subsequently on February 15, 1963, a local administrative 
committee of the State Bar charged that petitioner had solic-
ited bribes to obtain zoning changes for certain parcels of real 
property and had thereby violated his oath and duties as an 
attorpey and committed acts involving moral turpitud~ and 
disho;nesty. (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 6067, 6068, subds. (a), (c), 
(d), 'and 6106.) These charges encompassed the same three 
transactions that had been at issue during the criminal case 
and were set forth in three counts. In a fourth count the 
committee charged that during one of the foregoing transac-
tions, petitioner violated rule 9 of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct of the State Bar of California by commingling his 
client's money with his own and failing to deposit his client's 
funds in a separate trust account. After hearings at which 
most of the witnesses at the criminal trial testified and the 
record of that trial was introduced into evidence, the commit-
tee found petitioner guilty on two counts of soliciting bribes 
and on one count of failing to deposit a client's funds in a 
- separate trust account and drawing on these funds to meet his 
personal expenses. It recommended that petitioner be dis-
barred. On September 18, 1965, the Board of Governors of the 
State Bar by a vote of 13 to 2 made findings of fact approving 
the local committee's determination of guilt on three counts 
and its recommendation that petitioner be disbarred. 
Petitioner contends that the evidence is insufficient to sus-
taiu the findings of the board. [1] Findings of fact made 
by local administrative committees and the Board of Gov-
ernors are not binding on this court, and we will weigh the 
evidence upon which the findings rest. (Schullman v. State 
Bar, 59 Ca1.2d 590, 599 [30 Cal.Rptr. 834, 381 P.2d 658] j 
'I 
) 
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Sturr v. State Bar, 52 Cal.2d 125, 127 [338 P.2d 897].} 
[2J The burden is on the petitioner, however, to demonstrate 
that the findings are not supported by the evidence or that the 
recommendations are erroneous or unlawful. (Best v. State 
Bar, 57 Ca1.2d 633, 635 [21 Cal.Rptr. 589, 371 P.2d 325] ; Rock 
v. State Bar, 55 Da1.2d 724, 726 [12 Cal.Rptr. 857, 361 P.2d 
585] .) In meeting this burden, the petitioner must demon-
strate that the charges of unprofessional conduct are not "sus-
tained by convincing proof and to a reasonable certainty." 
(Brawner v. State Bar, 48 Ca1.2d 814, 818 [313 P.2d I].) 
[3J In making our determination we resolve all reasonable 
doubts in favor of the accused. If two or m~re equally reason-
able inferences may be drawn from a proved fact, the infer-. 
ence leading to a conclusion of innocence rather than the one 
leading to a conclusion of guilt will be accepted. (Bar Assn. of 
San Francisco y. SuUivan, 185 Cal. 621, 623-624 [198 P. 7].) 
[4, 6J When the findings and rccommendations rest pri-
marily on testimonial evidence, we are reluctant to reverse the 
decision of the local administrative committee, which was in a 
better position to evaluate conflicting statements after observ-
ing the demeanor of the witnesses and the character of their 
testimony. (Werner v. State Bar, 13 Cal.2d ~66, 676-677 [91 
P.2d 881] ; Mauer v. State Bar, 219 Cal. 271~ 276 [26 P.2d 
14].) Necessarily, however, less reliance is placed on this rule 
when, as in the present case, a jury heard much the same 
evidence that the local administrative committee heard and 
acquitted petitioner of virtually the same charges involved in 
the disciplinary proceedings.1 
Although petitioner was chargcd with three counts of solicit-
ing bribes and one count of violating rule 9, one of the bribery 
counts was dismissed. The State Bar also now concedes that 
the rule 9 violation should be limited to petitioner's failure to 
deposit his client's funds in a separate trust account. We shall 
consider the rule 9 charge first. 
On April 19, 1961, petitioner told Theodore Bentley, a real 
estate developer and builder, that for $12,500 Con-Tech Build-
ing Company, a corporation in WIlich Bentley held a one-third 
lThe acquittal of an attorney in a criminal trial does not bar the 
institution against him of disharment proceedings even if the issues in 
both proceedings are identical. (Best v. Btate Bar, G7 Ca1.2d 633, 637 
f21 Cal Rptr. 589,371 P.2d 32;)]; sec In ,'e Pcnnica, 36 N.J. 401, 418-419 
fl77 A.2d 721, 730].) The reasons for 1Iot applying a rule of res judicata 
are that the parties are different, the Cjuantum of proof required is dif-
ferent, and •• the purposes of the two proe('etlings arc vastly different. 
A criminal proc('cding luis fOI' its I"II'I'Use thl' pUllisllmcnt of the accused 
if he is found guilty. A discil'Jinn I·Y III'ocl'crling against an attorney is 
July 1966] ZITNY V. STATE BAR 
[64 C.2d '187; 51 Cal.Rptr. 825, 415 P.2d 5211 
791 
interest, could obtain a variance so that it might develop its 
property in Cypress City for residential purposes. Petitioner 
said that $500 would be a nonrecoverable retainer but that the 
$12,000 would be returned if the' use variance was not ap-
proved. About April 27 Con-Tech decided to accept this offer 
and Bentley brought $12,000 in small bills to petitioner's 
office. The money was placed in a manilla envelope that Bent-
ley then marked with a "T". and sealed with scotch tape. 
Bentley testified that no receipt was given. Petitioner testified 
that he did not give a receipt from an office receipt book, but 
drew a receipt on office stationery so that he could word it to 
describe accurately the transaction that had been agreed upon. 
No duplicate was kept by the office and no other notation 
concerning receipt of the funds was made on any other file in 
petitioner's office. 0 
Petitioner left the money in his desk for approximately 10 
days. On May 8 he placed it in the firm's safe deposit box and, 
according to petitioner, wrote "Ted Bentley (Con-Tech)" on 
the envelope. On May 29 the City Council of Cypress reversed 
a May 4 decision of the city planning commission and by °a 
three to two vote granted the use variance subject to three 
conditions. On June 1 petitioner removed $400 from the pre-
viously sealed envelope and then transferred the balance of the 
$12,000 to a newly-acquired personal safe deposit box. He testi-
fied that on June 1 he told his wife that the money belonged to 
Con-Tech and clipped a note to the same effect to the envelope. 
During the next several months petitioner made several with-
drawals from and deposits to this $12,000 fund. When he was 
arrested on October 10 only $3,880 remained in his safe de-
posit box but $7,960 was in his desk drawer. The first time 
that either of petitioner's partners. was told of this $12,000 
fee was on the day before petitioner's arrest. 
Bentley testified that petitioner had earned his fee when tlle 
variance was granted, and the State Bar does not now contend 
that petitioner misappropriated his client's funds or com-
mingled them with his own. It is undisputed, however, that 
before the variance was granted petitioner failed to sequester 
Con-Tech's funds as rule 9 requires. Section 6077 of the Busi-
ness and Professions Code provides that an attorney may be 
not intended for his punishment, but is for the protection of the public, 
the courts, and the legal profession." (Best v. State Bar, 57 Cal.2d 633, 
637 [21 Cal.Rptr. 589, 371 P.2d 325]; see Yapp v. State Bar, 62 Cal.2d 
809,817 [44 Cal.Rptr. 593,402 P.2d 361]; Ell; parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 
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disciplined only for a wilful breach of the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct. [6] To establish a wilful breach, it must be 
demonstrated that the person charged acted or omitted to act 
purposely, that is, that he knew what he was doing or not 
doing and that he intended either to commit the act or to 
abstain from committing it. (See Palmquist v. State Bar, 43 
Ca1.2d 42S, 435-436 [274 P.2d 640] ; cf. In re Trombley, 31 
Cal.2d SOl, 807-S0S [193 P.2d 734]; Towle v. Matheus, 130 
Cal. 574, 577 [62 P. 1064].) The wilfulness or intent may be 
proved by direct or by circumstantial evidence. (Cf. Kopa3z V. 
Kopa3z, 107 Cal.App.2d 308, 310 [237 P.2d 2S4] ; People v.· 
Hall, 27 Ca1.App.2d440, 444-445 [81 P.2d 24S] ; Witkin, Cal. 
Evidence (195S) § 156.) 
[7] Although the charge and the findings of the local 
administrative committee and the Board of Governors are de-
fective in failing to specify that petitioner's breach was wil-
ful, prejudice is not presumed from such a procedural error. 
(See McGrath v. State Bar, 21 Cal.2d 737,740 [135 P.2d 1].) 
[8] A review of the evidence shows that petitioner's 
breach was wilful and that the defect in pleadings and find-
ings was not prejudicial. Petitioner's firm maintained a 
clients' trust account in a local bank at the time of the trans-
action. Petitioner not only failed to deposit Con-Tech's money 
in the account but he did not use an office receipt or make any 
other notation in firm files to the effect that a potential fee had 
been collected. He did not even append a note to the envelope 
explaining that his firm held the enclosed money in trust for. 
the Con-Tech corporation or inform his partners that a fee had 
been collected. Not until the day before his arrest, more than 
five months after he first received the money, did petitioner 
inform either of the other members of the firm about the fee. 
The evidence establishes that petitioner wilfully omitted to 
place the $12,000 contingent fee in a separate clients' trust 
account and that he had no bona fide and reasonable belief 
that facts existed that justified such omission. (Cf. Palmquist 
v. State Bar, 43 Ca1.2d 428, 436 [247 P.2d 640]. See also 
People v. Vogel, 46 Ca1.2d 79S, 801 [299 P.2d 850].) 
[9] Petitioner contends, however, that the purpose of the 
sequestration provision of rule 9 is to protect the· funds of 
clients from the creditors of their attorneys. He asserts that 
under th~1!ircum.stances of this case, any danger to the Con-
Tech ,~ was negligible and the violation was therefore of 
little 'significance. The purpose of the rule is not so limited . 
• , The controlling question, . . . is not whether any harm or 
I 
~I 
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damage resulted to the particular clients from petitioner's 
handling of their affairs. . . ." The rules are designed to 
establish ethical standards for the Bar and to "prohibit unpro-
fessional conduct." (Higgins v: St'ate Bar, 46 Cal.2d 241, 246 
[293 P.2d 455] ; see McKinney v. State Bar, 62 Cal.2d 194, 196 
[41 Cal.Rptr. 665,397 P.2d 425].) [10] It is also immate-
rial that petitioner may have been ignorant of the provision of 
rule 9 that he violated. Where an attorney is charged with 
violating his oath by negligently failing to discharge his duties 
to "the best of his knowledge and ability" (Bus. & Prof. 
Code, § 6067), a mistake of law made in good faith may be a 
defense (see Call v. State Bar, 45 Ca1.2d 104, 110-111 [287 
P.2d 761]), for section 6067 recognizes that attorneys are not 
infallible and cannot at their peril be expected to know all of 
the law. In contrast section 6077 proscribes any wilful viola-
tion of the Rules of Professional Conduct and does not make 
knowledge of the rules an element of the offense. 
We conclude that petitioner was guilty of a wilful violation 
of rule 9. 
Petitioner was found guilty on two counts of soliciting 
bribes, in one case from Daniel Cohn, a real estate developer, 
and Robert Light, an attorney and a home builder, and in the 
other case from Bill Asawa, a real estate broker. In each case 
the State Bar contends that petitioner acted in concert with 
Councilman Denni, of the Cypress City Council, who con-
ducted the initial negotiations and later involved petitioner in 
the solicitation of the bribes. 
In 1960 Cohn, acting through the D and E Corporation, 
which' he owned, bought a 35-acre tract of land in Cypress. 
Arrangements were made with a closely affiliated company, 
Emblem Homes, for the construction of single-family resi-
dences. Light, who was Cohn '8 attorney as well as president 
/ and principal stockholder of Emblem Homes, applied for a use 
variance from the Cypress City Planning Commission. After 
the commission denied the application on November 3, 1960, 
Light appealed to the city council, which on the 14th of Novem-
ber took the matter under consideration. On November 29, the 
council granted ihe variance but attached a serics of condi-
. tions, the most significant of which required the developers to 
have their drainage plans approved by both the city engineer 
and the city council. ' 
During the latter part of 1960, Cohn also commenced nego-
tiations with Denni about the possibility of D and E purchas-
ing 15 acres of land owned by Denni and 41 acres owned by 
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Denni's parents. Although there is a con:8ict in the evidence 
as to whether an oral agreement was made with respect to the 
purchase and sale of the 15 acres, it is clear that no sale was 
ever completed. On March 20, 1961, Cohn and Denni arranged 
to meet at the Water Wheel Restaurant in Anaheim where 
Denni was to ha"e lunch with Councilmen Baroldi and Mc-
Carney and the city manager. According to Cohn, at this meet- ' 
ing Denni took him aside and told him that be should pur-
chase Denni's 15 acres. When Cohn refused, Denni stated that 
the drainage on the proposed subdivision was wrong and that 
the five-man council would not give final approval to the vari-
ance unless Cohn purchased the 15 acres for $15,000 an acre. 
If he agreed to the transaction, "the boys":-Baroldi and 
McCarney-would acquiesce in the use variance. According to 
Denni, he took Cohn aside to accuse him of failing to fulfill his 
oral agreement to buy the 15-acre tract, and when Cohn chided 
him on his negotiating innocence, Denni became angry and 
said, "I will never vote on another thing that you have. Unless 
I can block it. ' , 
On April 17, Light and Cohn submitted a drainage plan to 
the city council that had been approved by the city manager 
and the city engineer. Two councilmen voted for its acceptance 
but Denni, Baroldi, and McCarney voted against it. On May 
15 the city council again took up the drainage problem on the 
Cohn-Light tract of land. It decided to postpone any further 
consideration of possible solutions until a master drainage 
plan could be established for the area in which the tract was 
located. ' 
On June 8 Light made an appointment to see petitioner on 
that day. Light testified that he arranged the meeting because 
Denni had sent him information through one Ramon Fajardo 
that final approval for their zoning change would cost $20,000 
and that all further dealings should be carried on with peti-
tioner. These statements were confirmed by Fajardo. Accord-
ing to Denni, Fajardo offered to attempt to sell Denni's 15-
acre tract to D and E with whom he said he had some influ-
ence. Remembering his prior experiences with Cohn, Denni 
agreed but only reluctantly. When Fajardo later told him that 
D and E was again interested in making the purchase, DenDi 
told him to tell D and E that any negotiations would have to 
be undertaken with petitioner. 
At 2 p.m. on June 8 Light arrived in petitioner's office and 
took a seat in the reception room. Shortly thereafter, Denni 
arrived and was ushered into petitioner's library. A few 
) 
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minutes later, Light was brought into the library. What was 
discussed and what transpired at the meeting is sharply dis-
puted. According to Light, the thr~e men engaged in a brief 
discussion covering sundry unrelated topics and tIlen Denni 
requested that Light remove his coat. Light refused. Petitioner 
and Denni then left the room in that order. Several minutes 
later, petitioner returned and brought Light into his office. 
Denni again requested that he remove his coat. Light agreed 
and noticed that when Denni took it he "felt it quite a bit." 
Denni told him that to receive final approval on their zoning 
change, Emblem Homes and D and E would have to pay 
$20,000, some of which would be used to defray the expenses 
of certain councilmen fighting a recall action.2 Light was to 
pay' the money to petitioner on the following day, and if the 
zoning results were unsatisfactory the money would be re-
turned. Denni then turned to petitioner who had been present 
during the entire discussion and said, "You will handle this 
like them others. JJ Light told Denni and petitioner that he 
would have to discuss this transaction with his principal and 
that he thought $20,000 was a lot of money to pay. Thereupo~ 
Denni reduced the request to $15,000. Light departed and in-
formed Cohn of the proposed arrangement. On June 9 Light 
called petitioner· and told him that neither he nor his principal 
could accept the offer. Petitioner replied that "he understood, 
that he hoped that I would not think this was his idea, and he 
made the statement, 'We lawyers often work in gray areas.'" 
. Denni testi1ied that he received a phone call on June 8 from 
petitioner asking him to come to the office and meet :with a 
representative from D and Econcerning the sale of his 15-acre 
tract of land. He and Light conversed first in the reception 
, 2Denni was elected to the City Council of Cypresaon April 12, 1960. 
In August 1960, a recall petition. was filed against Councilmen Baroldi 
and McCamey. Apparently, the signers of the petition wished to include 
Denni but could not do so sinee he had not been in omec for six months. 
(Elec. Code, • 27500.) Petitioner was employed by Baroldi and McCar· 
Dey, and he sought an injunction to nullify the recall proceedings. Late 
,in 1960, the trial court denied the injunction. A Los Angeles law firm 
was employed for the appeal, sinee it was felt that petitioner did not 
have sumcient experience. McCarney testified that when he protested 
. that he could not afford the expense of an appeal, Denni said that he 
would take care of the bills. According to McCarney, Denni said he would 
spend $50,000 to fight this recall. This remark was discounted by Mc-
Carney, however, since Denni was prone to make "superlative state· 
ments. " Denni testi1led that he agreed to collect the funds nceded for 
an appeal but never mentioned $50,000. In response to a question con-
cerning his motives in aiding Baroldi and McCarney, he stated .. Other 
than fellowship, would be the only thing I sensed, perhaps an obligation." 
-.'~ 
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room, then in the library, and finally in petitioner's office. 
Petitioner was not present during the entire conversation, 
which dealt with Denni's 15 acres and not Emblem Homes' 
variance. Light was not asked to remove his coat. Eventually 
he and Light got into a heated argument and Light even 
threatened to damage llim in his dairy business. Petitioner's 
version of the meeting corresponded to Denni's explanation. 
He also said that he had received several phone calls during 
the meeting and had left the office on each occasion to receive 
them. As Denni and Light left the office, each made insulting , 
remarks to him about the other. On June 9 petitioner spoke to 
Light about D and E's refusal to buy Denni's 15 acres but 
said nothing about lawyers' working in gray areas. Peti-
tioner's secretary testified that the meeting had been noisy, 
that Denni had been shouting, and that petitioner had left his 
office several times in order to answer phone calls. 
Light testified that shortly after the June 8 meeting, the, ____ .. 
problems thatD and E and Emblem Homes were having in 
obtaining a variance ended. Light learned that officials in the 
nearby town of Westminster had been arrested for their activi-
ties in zoning matters. He then placed his zoning application 
on the city council's agenda for its June 19 meeting. Although 
there had been no change in drainage proposals since May 15 
when the matter was first postponed, the council, by a four to 
nothing vote-Denni abstaining because he was an adjacent 
property owner-gave full approval to the variance. Accord-
ing to Fajardo, at approximately the same· time he became 
aware of the Westminster affair and, in a state of concern 
about his own role in dealing with Light, called petitioner, 
who told him not to worry because the transaction he had 
helped arrange had never been completed. . 
During this same six-month period in 1961, petitioner and 
Denni also became involved with Bill Asawa, areal .estate 
broker. Asawa represented one Musara "Muzzy" Morita, who 
owned a 35-acre tract in the City of Cypress and had arranged 
a complex multi-party transaction for diSposing of the lapd. A 
July 9, 1961, deadline had been established for completing the 
transaction and one of the conditions that Morita had to meet 
before that time was the procurement of a zoniDg change to 
permit residential development on land then classified as agri-
cultural. 
On April 6, 1961, the Cypress City Planning Commission 
approved the Morita application for an amendment to the zon-
ing ordinance. On April 17, the city council reviewed this 
) 
) 
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action and by a three to two vote-Denni, McCarney, and 
Baroldi comprising the majority-rejected the application. On 
May 15 the council, after listening to Asawa plead the case for 
approval of the zoning change, decided to postpone any deci-
sion apparently for a maximum period of 120 days, during 
which time the question of establishing a school site on the 
Morita property could be resolved. 
On May 16 Asawa met with Denni and discussed drainage 
and school site problems. The testimony is in conflict about 
bow or why petitioner's name was brought into the discussion 
and who was responsible for making an appointment for 
Asawa to meet petitioner at 4 :30 p.m. on that day. According 
to petitioner, after Asawa arrived, he asked petitioner to repre-
sent the Morita group in obtaining a zoning change from the 
Cypress City Council. Asawa explained that Morita was hav-
ing difficulties because no provision had been made for locat-
ing a school either within or near the subdivision and because 
agreement could not be reached on an adequate drainage plan. 
Petitioner then raised the question of a fee and told Asawa 
that it could be based on time spent or on the contingency that 
satisfactory results. would be obtained. Asawa said that he 
preferred the latter method, and petitioner stated that his con-
tingent fee would come to $21,000.- Asawa told petitioner that 
be wanted to check with his principal and would get in touch 
with him in the near future. 
Asawa's testimony presents a sharp contrast. He testified 
that he was ushered into petitioner's office and asked if he 
knew who the power on the city council was. When he said 
Denni, petitioner inquired about the number of acres in the 
Morita tract. Asawa answered 35 and petitioner said, "Let's 
see. 35 times 6; that is 21,000." Petitioner told him that the 
sum would have to be paid in cash and would be distributed to 
those he represented, one of whom was Denni. The money 
would be used to pay. bills arising out of the recall proceed-
ings. If the $21,000 were paid, the school issue would be 
dropped. Asawa left, stating that he had to discuss the proposi-
. tion with his principal. On May 18 petitioner called bim and 
lIn explaining how he arrived at this sum, petitioner presented two 
different theories. t'irst, he stated that since he knew the increase in 
property value in Cypress caused by rezoning land from agricultural to 
residential use was $6,000 an acre, he decided to charge 10 percent of 
the increase or $600 an acre. Later he said that he chose such a high fee 
because he knew who opposed Asawa and that convincing them to vote 
for the zoning change might damage petitioner's political reputation 
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asked if a decision had been reached. Asawa replied in the 
negative. On May 21 petitioner called again and asked Asawa 
. to come to his office.' 
About May 23 Asawa went to petitioner's office. According 
to Asawa, he asked petitioner about a reduction in price and 
the terms of paYment. Petitioner stated that he could check 
with his principals about the amount but that the payments 
.should be in cash, one-half prior to the council meeting of May 
29, and the remainder after the second reading of the ~ap at 
the next subsequent .council session. According to petitioner, 
Asawa asked. if the fee could be reduced. Petitioner rePfu!d 
that this contingent fee was only the equivalent of Asawa'~ 
broker's fee but that it could be reduced if a retainer were 
paid immediately. 
Representatives of tlie district attorney's office got in touch 
with Asawa before he saw petitioner again. They were inves-
tigating reports of bribery in Cypress City in connection with 
rezoning matters and asked Asawa to cooperate with them. He 
agreed and on June 6 called petitioner and made an appoint-
ment to see him later that day. Before leaving for petitioner's . __ .1 . 
office, he was equipped with a transmitting device. According 
to Asawa, after he began reviewing the proposed transaction 
with petitioner and asking if payments could be by means 
other than cash, petitioner asked him to stand and open his 
coat. Petitione.r ran his. hands oyer Asawa's body but appar-
ently did not find thl' transmitting equipment. When the con-
versation resumed, petitioner stated that the money could be 
paid by check and would be u.sed for attorney's fees. Asawa 
stated that "this is a little bit different than what we dis-
cussed about prior to" and petitioner said, "This is correct." 
According to petitioner, Asawa began the conversation by ask-
ing about the size of the fee and the methods of payment. 
Petitioner explained how retainers and contingent fees oper-
ated and said a check would suffiee. WheJ;lAsawa asked if 
petitioner's client in this affair was Denni, petitioner replied 
that he had represented Denni in other matters but that 
Asawa was his client in this tran~ction. Asawa then raised 
the question of cash payments again, and petitioner became 
suspicious and asked Asawa to remove' his coat. Asawa re-
fused, and petitioner opened Asawa's coat and scrutinized 
'Petitioner stated that during the middle of May he had several phone 
conversations with Asawa. He testified, however, that the calls were all 
plaeed by Asawa and that it was Asawa wllo requested :1notber meeting. 
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him. He saw nothing unusual and after several more minutes 
of conversation, the meeting ended.1I 
In the week following his meeting of June 6 with petitioner, 
Asawa had several long discussions with Denni. According to 
Asawa, Denni offered to reduce the sum needed to secure the 
zoning change. According to Denni, these discussions were pri-
marily about the problem of locating a new school site in tIle 
City of Cypress. During 'One of the conversations, he advised 
Asawa that petitioner was quoting too high a fee for his ser-
vices and even called petitioner to inform him that his charges 
were exorbitant. City Manager Robert Rogers, who attended 
one meeting between Asawa and Denni, testified that the con-
versation dealt only with the problem of locating a school on 
or near the Morita tract of land.s 
On June 19 the rezoning application for the Morita tract 
was again submitted to the council. It was approved by a four 
to nothing vote with Denni abstaining. The school problem was 
solved by an agreement to the effect that if property were 
taken for a school site, the school district would pay the sub-
divider the same price that he had paid to the property owner. 
This tentative approval came too late, however, to obtain a 
final council decision before the July 9 deadline for closing the 
escrow agreements. As a result, Morita's land was not sold 
and Asawa did not receive a commission. 
[11] In assessing this wealth of testimony, we can isolate 
only a few undisputed facts. Before his involvement with 
Light, Asawa, and Bentley, petitioner had represented Coun-
cilman Denni in various legal matters. Councilmen Denni, Ba-
roldi, and McCarney were working together to fight the recall 
of the latter two men. Denni, who was not subject to recall, 
had taken it upon himself to raise the money to appeal from 
the judgment refusing to enjoin the recall. He did so partly 
because he felt that he had an obligation to the other two men. 
Petitioner. had been engaged by Baroldi and McCarney at 
. Denni's suggestion to represent them in one phase of their 
fight. The votes of Denni, Baroldi, and McCarney coincided on 
IIAlthough a tape recording was made, apparently it was too unintelli-
gible to be introduced into evidence. . 
SRogers testified that at a later ehance meeting, Asawa told him in 
effeet that if Rogers would use pressure, he could obtain a piece of land 
owned by the Standard Development Company that cou1d be used for the 
double purpose of providing a site for a school and solving the drainage 
problems on the Morita tract. Rogers also stated that after Fajardo 
testified before the grand jury that indicted Denni and petitioner, 
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all three of the zoning changes at issue. Light, Asawa, and 
Bentley got in touch with petitioner on the basis of sugges-
tions from Denni. The fees that petitioner admitted he charged 
Con-Tech and quoted to Asawa are calculable at $600 an acre 
and coincide with the sum that Light claims was originally 
asked from him. The fees themselves are markedly higher than 
any that petitioner had charged previously. Denni admitted 
that his vote on rezoning matters could be influenced by per-
sonal considerations. Petitioner searched Asawa for a record-
ing or transmitting device. The city council changed its posi-
tion and finally approved the Asawa and Light rezoning 
applications, although there was no appreciable change in the 
circumstances surrounding the specific tracts and the plans for 
their development. No bribe was paid, however, to receive the 
council's approval. 
, With the p~ble exception of petitioner's searching 'Asawa, 
these undisputed facts are as consistent with petitioner's 
claimed innocence as with his alleged guilt. Moreover, in view 
of Asawa's persistent questioning about a cash fee, peti-
tioner's suspicion and concern that Asawa might be surrepti-
tiously recording or transmitting their conv~rsation is too 
ambiguous to constitute persuasive evidence of consciousness 
of guilt. Accordingly, in determining whether the charges of 
soliciting bribes are sustained, we must rely entirely on testi-
mony that is in total conflict. Moreover, we are faced with 
contradictory assessments of this testimony by the jury and 
the local administrative committee that heard and saw the 
witnesses. Weare unable to determine from our own evalua-
tion of the record that any of the inconsistent testimony is .- .-.--. 
incredible' on its face or that the jury's determination is en-
titled to less weight than that of the local committee. Since we 
must resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of the accused, we 
conclude in the light of all the circumStances that the charges 
of soliciting bribes have not been "sustained by ~nTincing 
proof and to a reasonable certainty." (Brawner v. Stale Bar, 
supra, 48 Cal.2d 814, 818.) 
For petitioner's wilful violation of rule 9 we believe that a 
public reprimand is sufficient. This opinion shall serve as such 
reprimand. 
